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Introduction 
Some building is easy. Development projects have, by and large, been successful at 
building physical stuff: schools, highways, irrigation canals, hospitals and even building 
the buildings that house government ministries, courts and agencies. But some building is 
hard. As anyone with experience in development knows, building the capabilities of the 
human systems is hard. That applies to the human system called “the state.” Getting the 
human beings in the state to use the physical stuff available to produce the flows of 
improved services (learning in schools, water to farmers, cures for patients) that lead to 
desirable outcomes for citizens has proven much more difficult.  
There is no shortage of small and large scale examples. One of us was recently asked to 
review the design of an education project in an African country; it was the sixth in a 
string of large projects supporting education in this country. The project documents 
described the deplorable state of the capability of the ministry of education to even 
implement the project—much less to autonomously define problems, gather and analyze 
information, make decisions based on analysis, and implement their own decisions. 
Therefore the project proposed funding to build more schools but also significant funding 
to build the capability of the ministry. But of course all of the five previous projects over 
a span of twenty years had also sought to build both schools and ministry capability, and 
had succeeded at only one of those objectives.  
This dynamic also often characterizes “policy reform”: a government succeeds in passing 
laws or creating new boxes in organizational charts or declaring new administrative 
processes, but these “reforms” are frequently not implemented or used. Andrews (2011), 
for example, documents the case of the adoption of public financial management reforms 
in Africa, showing how the higher level and surface processes changed (e.g., how 
budgets were written and new accounting techniques were adopted) but how the core 
processes determining how money was actually spent remained impervious to reform. 
Perhaps the most spectacular large-scale contemporary example is that the richest and 
most powerful nation in the history of humankind has just spent a decade—and enormous 
amounts of blood (almost 2000 dead) and treasure (over half a trillion dollars)—
attempting to (re)build state capability in a very small and poor South Asian country. The 
United States is now committed to leaving by 2014, almost certainly leaving behind a 
state less capable than what Afghanistan had in the 1970s.  
Why has building state capability been so hard? In past work we argued that development 
interventions—projects, policies, programs—create incentives for developing country 
organizations to adopt ‘best practices’ in laws, policies and organizational practices 
which look impressive (because they appear to comply with professional standards or 
have been endorsed by international experts) but are unlikely to fit into particular  
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developing country contexts.
1 Adapting from the new institutionalism literature in 
sociology
2, we suggested that reform dynamics are often characterized by ‘isomorphic 
mimicry’—the tendency to introduce reforms that enhance an entity’s external legitimacy 
and support, even when they do not demonstrably improve performance. These strategies 
of isomorphic mimicry in individual projects, policies and programs add up to ‘capability 
traps’: a dynamic in which governments constantly adopt “reforms” to ensure ongoing 
flows of external financing and legitimacy yet never actually improve. The fact that the 
“development community” is five decades into supporting the building of state capability 
and that there has been so little progress in so many places (obvious spectacular successes 
like South Korea notwithstanding) suggests the generic “theory of change” on which 
development initiatives for building state capability are based is deeply flawed.  
How might countries escape from capability traps? This is the question we begin 
answering in the current article. We first revisit the argument about how and why 
countries and development partners get trapped in a cycle of reforms that fail to enhance 
capability (indeed, may exacerbate pre-existing constraints). We posit that capability 
traps emerge under specific conditions which yield interventions that (a) aim to reproduce 
particular external solutions considered ‘best practice’ in dominant agendas, (b) through 
pre-determined linear processes, (c) that inform tight monitoring of inputs and 
compliance to ‘the plan’, and (d) are driven from the top down, assuming that 
implementation largely happens by edict.
3  
A second section suggests that capability traps can be avoided and overcome by fostering 
different types of interventions. In direct counterpoint to the four conditions above, we 
propose that efforts to build state capability should (i) aim to solve particular problems in 
local contexts, (ii) through the creation of an ‘authorizing environment’ for decision-
making that allows ‘positive deviation’ and experimentation, (iii) involving active, 
ongoing and experiential learning and the iterative feedback of lessons into new 
solutions, doing so by (iv) engaging broad sets of agents to ensure that reforms are viable, 
legitimate and relevant—i.e., politically supportable and practically implementable. We 
propose this kind of intervention as an alternative approach to enhancing state capability, 
one we call Problem Driven Iterative Adaptation (PDIA). We emphasize that PDIA is not 
so much ‘new’ thinking as an attempt at a pragmatic and operational synthesis of related 
                                                       
1 See Pritchett and Woolcock (2004); Pritchett, Woolcock and Andrews (2010); and Andrews (2011). 
2 See the classic work of Dimaggio and Powell (1983). 
3 An important paper by Denizer, Kaufmann and Kraay (2011: 2), however, shows that implementation is 
actually of crucial importance to project quality. On the basis of an examination of 6000 World Bank projects, 
these authors conclude that “measures of project size, the extent of project supervision, and evaluation lags are all 
significantly correlated with project outcomes, as are early-warning indicators that flag problematic projects 
during the implementation stage… measures of World Bank project task manager quality matter significantly for 
the ultimate outcome of projects.”   
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arguments articulated in recent years by an array of scholars and practitioners of 
development working in different sectors and disciplines.  
Capability traps in the effort to build state capability 
Development interventions can be usefully analyzed at three social levels (Figure 1): 
agents, at the front line and in leadership positions; organizations inhabited by agents; 
and the environment or ecosystem of organizations. Within each category, Figure 1 also 
illustrates the poles of behaviors (for agents and organizations) or conditions (within eco-
systems).  
Frontline workers decide daily between mere compliance with rules (or even negative 
deviations) and positive performance-driven actions. Leaders and managers choose 
between using their positions to pursue narrow private or organizational gain or to create 
new public value within and through the organizations they run. Organizations manage 
how and from whence they derive the legitimacy needed to survive and thrive, balancing 
isomorphic pressures to comply with external expectations of what they should look like 
and the challenge of demonstrating performance regardless of appearance.  
At the systemic level, fields of organizations that include suppliers, producers, regulators, 
funders and consumers determine implicit and explicit ways of evaluating change and 
novelty. Systems could reward compliance with fixed agendas of what is considered 
appropriate and ‘right’ practice at one extreme, or look to the simple demonstration of 
improved functionality at another. A second tension also plays out at this systemic level, 
affecting the space created for novelty: closed systems constrain novelty and do not allow 
new approaches to emerge, while open systems facilitate novelty (see Brafman and 
Beckstrom 2006). 
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Figure 1.Tensions playing out at different levels of engagement in development 
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Countries find themselves in capability traps when conditions at each level foster 
decisions and behaviors on the left side of Figure 1; this can create a low level 
equilibrium. When the ecosystem for organizations evaluates novelty based on agenda-
conformity rather than enhanced functionality, then the space for novelty is closed and 
subsequently cascades (Carlile and Lakani 2011). In such situations, organizations adopt 
“isomorphic mimicry” strategies of looking like successful organizations: leaders seek 
organizational survival, continued budgets and rents by complying with external 
standards of legitimacy instead of encouraging new ideas, products and solutions, while 
front line workers choose routine compliance (at best; at worst, often corruption or 
malfeasance) over concern for the customers, clients and citizens they serve. The difficult 
reality is that once the “capability trap” is sprung there is no incentive—and often no 
possibility—for any one organization or leader or front-line agent to break out.  
Much of the literature on capacity and corruption focuses on the role agents play in such 
situations. It is common to hear statements like: “The country would progress if only it 
had less corrupt leaders and more capable and concerned civil servants.”
4 Blaming agents 
in this way suggests a personalized rather than systemic perspective on why countries 
remain poor—one which is obviously false. This perspective has yielded efforts to 
discipline agents and limit the opportunities for rent seeking via organizational 
interventions like civil service, judicial and public finance reform. Organizations in 
developing countries have been required to accept such interventions for decades now. 
As Rodrik (2008: 100) notes, “institutional reform promoted by multilateral organizations 
such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, or the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) is heavily biased towards a best-practice model. It presumes it is 
possible to determine a unique set of appropriate institutional arrangements ex ante, and 
views convergence toward those arrangements as inherently desirable.” Such apparent 
convergence is undertaken to ensure continued legitimacy with, and support from, the 
international community. A common example is procurement reform: laws requiring 
competitive bidding are a procedure that many development organizations require their 
client countries to adopt in order to receive financial support. Such requirements, for 
instance, were among the first demands international organizations made in post war 
Liberia, Afghanistan and Sudan. They are intended to constrain corruption, discipline 
agents, and bring an air of formality and legitimacy to the way governments operate.  
We hold, however, that these reform initiatives are now, ironically, among the drivers of 
capability traps in developing countries, because they create and reinforce processes 
through which global players constrain local experimentation—while at the same time 
                                                       
4 For example, Greg Mills from South Africa’s Brenthurst Foundation recently noted that Malawi would 
be doing better “If only Malawians were luckier with their leaders.” See his article in the Malawi Democrat: 
http://www.malawidemocrat.com/politics/long-fingers-in-the-warm-heart-of-africa/   
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facilitating the perpetuation of dysfunction
5. The conditions we allude to have 
characterized the politics and processes of international development since at least the 
1980s, a period when government reform became an important dimension of 
development work. At that time, many external development organizations began tying 
their funds to such reforms, as well as using conditions in structural adjustment and other 
budget financing initiatives (e.g. “sector wide” approaches). This has made it increasingly 
difficult for a developing country to receive external financial assistance without 
committing to change their government and market structures. The commitments must be 
made ex ante and promise reform that is open to visible evaluation in relatively short time 
periods, such that external development partners have something tangible to point to 
when justifying the disbursement of funds. In this relationship, development partners 
have to accept proposed reform ideas and sign off on their attainment. This role has fed 
the creation of various scripts defining acceptable types of reform. The World 
Governance Indicators, for instance, guide countries in choosing governance reforms by 
illustrating what is considered legitimate. Similarly, the Doing Business indicators inform 
what reforms are needed to the institutions connecting government and the private sector, 
while mechanisms such as Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability (PEFA) 
indicators focus developing countries on conforming with characteristics ostensibly 
reflecting “good international practices … critical … to achieve sound public financial 
management” (PEFA 2006: 2). 
Such scripts, we argue, have essentially closed the space for novelty in the development 
system, imposing narrow agendas of what constitutes acceptable change. Developing 
countries and organizations operating within them are regularly evaluated on their 
compliance with these scripts, and the routine and generalized solutions they offer for 
establishing “good governance”, facilitating private sector growth, managing public 
finances, and more. Organizations like finance ministries or central banks gain legitimacy 
by agreeing to adopt such reforms, regardless of whether they offer a path towards 
demonstrated success in a particular context. Leaders of the organizations, for their part, 
can further their own careers by signing off on such interventions. Their agreement to 
adopt externally mandated reforms facilitates the continued flow of external funds, which 
can further various public and private interests. Front line workers ostensibly required to 
implement these changes are seldom part of the conversation about change, however, and 
thus have no incentive to contribute ideas about how things could be improved.  
                                                       
5 Our argument at the institutional and organizational level is similar to that made by Nicolas van de Walle 
(2001) about “structural adjustment” in Africa. He points out that engagement of governments in the process of 
reform—even when patently insincere on the part of governments and when reforms were not implemented—
brought external legitimacy. This contributed to the puzzle of the region with the worst development outcomes 
having the most stable governments.   
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The example of procurement reform in countries like Liberia and Afghanistan is a good 
instance of this dynamic in action. PEFA indicators and United Nations models of good 
procurement systems tout competitive bidding as a generic solution to many procurement 
maladies, including corruption and value for money concerns. Competitive bidding 
regimes are introduced through laws, as are the creation of independent agencies, the 
implementation of procedural rules and the introduction of transparency mechanisms. 
These various ‘inputs’ are readily evaluated as ‘evidence’ that change is in effect. 
Countries are rewarded for producing these inputs; government entities and vendors 
subjected to such mechanisms are assumed to simply comply. The result is a top-down 
approach to building procurement capacity (and beyond) in these governments, through 
which external role players impose themselves on local contexts and crowd out potential 
contributions local agents might make to change. These local agents have every incentive 
to treat reforms as signals, adopting external solutions that are not necessarily politically 
accepted or practically possible in the local context. But when the conditions are wrong, 
this mimicry signaling is the easiest route to achieving legitimacy, especially when the 
pathway to creating real value and facilitating actual improvement in performance is 
uncertain, risky and potentially contentious. Local agents have little incentive to pursue 
improved functionality in such settings, especially when they are rewarded so 
handsomely for complying with externally mandated ‘forms’ (appearances).  
Escaping capability traps and actually building state capability 
The emphasis on form (what organizations ‘look like’) over function (what they actually 
‘do’) is a crucial characteristic of the capability trap facing many developing countries. 
The challenge of escaping this trap therefore involves focusing on improved government 
functionality as the key to improved state capability. The basic message must be that 
interventions are successful if they empower a constant process through which agents 
make organizations better performers, regardless of the forms adopted to effect such 
change. The politics of this re-focusing recommendation are obviously complex. They 
require, for instance, challenging perspectives about when and how to tie development 
funding to reform results, asking if external agents and solutions can build local state 
capabilities, and clarifying whether and how local agents and solutions should play a 
greater role in their own development. They may also entail adopting reforms that, at 
least initially, powerful critics can deride as unprofessional (‘promoting non-best-practice 
solutions’), inefficient (‘reinventing the wheel’), even potentially unethical (‘failing to 
meet global standards’). These are far from idle concerns. 
This section does not address these political narratives. Instead, it offers some potential 
ideas and practical suggestions for how the development process might look if political 
discourse did call for a change in the approach to reforming governments and building 
state capability. As noted above, we fully recognize that others have voiced related 
concerns across various sectors in a range of forums; these previous articulations,  
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however, have mostly stopped at critique rather than moving on to propose concrete, 
supportable, implementable alternatives. To this end, our alternative draws on and 
synthesizes related themes that get at the common core idea: ‘learning organizations’ 
(Senge 1990 [2006]), ‘projects as policy experiments’ (Rondinelli 1993), ‘adaptive versus 
technical problems’ (Heifetz 1994), ‘positive deviance’ (Marsh et al 2004; Pascale, 
Sternin and Sternin 2010), institutional ‘monocropping’ versus ‘deliberation’ (Evans 
2004), ‘experimentation’ (Mukand and Rodrik 2005; Manzi 2012), ‘good-enough 
governance’ (Grindle 2004), ‘democracy as problem solving’ (Briggs 2008), the 
‘sabotage of harms’ (Sparrow 2008), ‘second-best institutions’ (Rodrik 2008), ‘interim 
institutions’ (Adler, Sage and Woolcock 2009), ‘upside down governance’ (Institute for 
Development Studies 2010), ‘just-enough governance’ (Levy and Fukuyama 2010), ‘best 
fit’ strategies (Booth 2011), ‘principled incrementalism’ (Knaus 2011), and ‘experiential 
learning’ (Pritchett, Samji and Hammer 2012), among others. 
Our proposed approach, which we call Problem-Driven Iterative Adaptation (PDIA), is 
based on four core principles. We are at pains to stress that these are broad principles 
which are consistent with a wide range of implementation options rather than a specific 
single program or approach. That is, what we are proposing is not itself yet another 
“solution” that countries need to implement or a recipe they should follow. Rather, we 
believe these are the elements of approaches that will create enhanced possibilities of 
success in an array of sectors and can be implemented in a variety of modalities and 
country contexts. 
The four elements, to be amplified below, stress that reform activities should  
(i)  aim to solve particular problems in particular local contexts via  
(ii)  the creation of an ‘authorizing environment’ for decision-making that 
encourages experimentation and ‘positive deviance’
6, which gives rise to 
(iii)  active, ongoing and experiential (and experimental) learning and the 
iterative feedback of lessons into new solutions, doing so by  
(iv)  engaging broad sets of agents to ensure that reforms are viable, 
legitimate and relevant—that is, are politically supportable and 
practically implementable. 
 
We now address each of these items in turn.  
                                                       
6 The precise meanings and origins of the terms ‘authorizing environment’ and ‘positive deviance’ are 
provided below. They come from different literatures (the first from public administration, the second from 
nutrition) but we have found it fruitful to bring them together.  
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The importance of solving problems, not selling solutions 
Efforts to build state capability should begin by asking “what is the problem?” instead of 
“which solution should we adopt?” Focusing on prevailing problems is the most direct 
way of redressing the bias to externally prescribed forms towards internal needs for 
functionality; it ensures that problems are locally defined, not externally determined, and 
puts the onus on performance, not compliance. It provides a window onto the challenge 
of building state capability, forcing agents to assess the ambiguities and weaknesses of 
incumbent structures, to identify areas where these need to be broken down and de-
institutionalized, and to look for better ways of doing things.  
The idea of a ‘window’ is reminiscent of Kingdon’s (1995) work on policy change. The 
many applications of his ‘multiple streams’ theory show that problems commonly bring 
an array of policy and institutional issues onto the change agenda.
7 Faced with problems 
they cannot ignore, agents across the social and political spectrum become aware of 
structural weaknesses they usually do not consider. This awareness often becomes the 
basis of coalition building across networks, where agents at different positions are drawn 
together to deal with a common concern (Zakocs 2006; see also Pires 2011). Problems 
also generate action and change from these communities, given the common argument 
that “[i]nstitutional change and improvement are motivated more by knowledge of 
problems than by knowledge of success” (Cameron 1986: 67). 
Not all problems foster such attention and motivation, however. Valéry Ridde (2009) 
shows, for instance, that health care reformers in Burkina Faso were quite inattentive to 
the problem of unequal access in the country. He offers various reasons for this, including 
the lack of widely shared measures of access and inequality. Without such measures, 
“verbal gymnastics” allowed different stakeholders to hold varying views about the issue, 
some even believing it had been solved by past initiatives (Ridde 2009: 944). His 
observations support Kingdon’s argument that ‘issues’ or factual ‘conditions’ have to be 
politically and socially constructed to gain attention as ‘problems’. This involves raising 
the visibility of issues through spectacular ‘focusing events’ (such as crises), the use of 
statistical indicators, or manipulation of feedback from previous experiences.  
Initiatives to build state capability can focus on problems by facilitating this kind of 
‘construction’. This could involve using use tools like the ‘5-why technique’ or Ishikawa 
diagrams.
8 These serve to de-construct problems, identify root causes and help agents 
reflect on contextual inadequacies. The 5-why technique pushes agents to identify a 
problem and then answer ‘why’ it is a problem five times. The rationale is that agents 
typically focus on issues and need to think beyond these to specify the problem that could 
                                                       
7 See Barzelay and Gallego (2006); Guldbrandsson and Fossum (2009); and Ridde (2009). 
8 See Ishikawa and Loftus (1990); Serrat (2009); and Wong (2011).  
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motivate change. A seasoned development expert, for instance, might say that her 
problem relates to the lack of a particular ‘form’ of government—or externally mandated 
best practice—but will be forced to reflect on the functional challenge when asked 
repeatedly ‘why’ this matters, and for whom. Imagine the following:  
  “The problem is that we get a D on the PEFA procurement indicator, 
because we do not have a law requiring competitive bidding across 
government.” 
  Why does it matter? “Without this law there is an incentive not to use 
competitive bidding in procurement deals.” 
  Why does it matter? “Without this incentive, most procurement deals are 
currently done through sole source methods.” 
  Why does it matter? “Sole source methods can increase corruption and 
lead to higher procurement costs and lower quality.”  
  Why does it matter? “We have evidence that many procurement deals 
have been overly costly and goods are poorly provided.”  
  Why does it matter? “High cost, low quality procurement is undermining 
the provision of key services across government. 
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Figure 2. Breaking problems down, so that they drive to solutions 
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This kind of specification engenders a focus on the high cost and low quality of 
procurement across government, which is a functional problem of performance. Contrast 
this to the starting point where the emphasis was on introducing an externally defined 
‘best practice’ law to mandate competitive bidding. In shifting the emphasis towards a 
concern for improved functionality, this kind of process uncovers the real challenges of 
building capability in development. In this case the challenge is not to adopt a new law 
but to improve the cost and quality of procurement. This is a much more complex 
problem but the one that needs solving and, crucially, the one that is unlikely to be 
addressed by simply mandating the use of competitive bidding. Problem-focused 
processes can get agents to work through the complexity of these problems and identify 
possible entry points for solutions. Cause and effect exercises can help in this respect, 
ensuring problems drive the search for solutions. As an example, Figure 2 shows a 
potential Ishikawa analysis of the proposed problem. 
Problems always have multiple causes, which a well-constructed problem focus helps 
emphasize. Reflecting this, Figure 2 shows how the procurement problem alluded to 
earlier might be framed and broken down to garner attention and empower a local process 
of finding solutions. The problem effect is specified at the right, for a particular sector, 
using data that helps stimulate attention. It is then de-constructed into potential causes 
and sub-causes, with three major ‘branches’ illustrated—reflecting problems in the 
contracting process, the contracting law and the vendor itself. The issue of sole sourcing 
contracting is mentioned as a potential sub-cause, but is one of many such issues and not 
the focal point of engagement. When local agents are taken through such exercises they 
become invested in solving the problem, focused on the many potential entry points to 
start addressing them, and disabused of the notion that there is any one easy externally 
mandated solution.  
When external agents provoke such processes they communicate the intention to provide 
an open space for novelty and an emphasis on improved functionality as the basis of 
evaluating reform. The focus on problems also incentivizes organizations to emphasize 
their performance, and encourages contributions from leaders and front-line workers to 
work for change. Many argue that agents only mobilize such contributions when 
prompted by problems, actively participating in change “only when they are able to frame 
the grievances of aggrieved constituencies, diagnose causes, [and] assign blame” (Snow 
and Benford 1992: 150). All of these influences involve a shift towards the right hand 
side of Figure 1—and out of the capability trap.  
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The importance of ‘authorizing environments’ for decision-making that 
encourage experimentation and ‘positive deviance’ 
Problem-driven interventions facilitate an escape from capability traps most effectively 
when they point to “feasible remedial action [that] can be meaningfully pursued” in the 
search for solutions (Chan 2010: 3). In this respect, and to be genuinely useful, problems 
must offer local agents a pathway to find solutions. We do not believe immediate 
solutions are needed in these situations, given that agents who see the complexity of real 
problems are seldom likely to accept the mirage of one-best-way solutions. Even if they 
do, given isomorphic pressures, we strongly advise against closing the space for novelty 
by providing or imposing easy answers; even if these answers have value, they are 
unlikely to address all of the problem dimensions needing attention. If completely new to 
a context, they are also likely to lack the political acceptance and everyday capacity 
required to work effectively. As such, external agents may possess potential answers but 
those ‘answers’ must still be experimented with through a process that empowers the 
search for “technically viable solutions to locally perceived problems” (Greenwood, 
Suddaby and Hinings 2002: 60).  
In thinking of what such process should look like, we are reminded of theoretical 
arguments about how policy and institutional solutions often emerge; as a puzzle, over 
time, given the accumulation of many individual pieces. Modern versions of such a 
perspective are commonly called incrementalism or gradualism, and attributed primarily 
to Lindblom (1959), who famously referred to these processes as ‘muddling through’. 
The approach holds that groups typically ‘find’ institutional solutions through a series of 
small, incremental steps, especially when these involve ‘positive deviations’
9 from extant 
realities. One might start addressing the problem shown in Figure 2 by gathering 
evidence of the textbook vendor’s contractual violations, for instance, or building an 
informal database of when textbooks were delivered.  
Such steps are relatively cheap and have the prospect of early success, or quick wins. The 
blend of cheapness and demonstrable success characterize positive deviations and are 
important in contexts where change encounters opposition, which is usually the case with 
government reforms in developing (and developed) countries. The small steps also help 
flush out contextual challenges, including those that emerge in response to the 
                                                       
9 The notion of ‘positive deviance’ in development comes from important research on nutrition in poor 
communities in Vietnam (see Marsh et al 2004), where some children, despite the desperate physical conditions in 
which  they  lived,  were  nonetheless  found  to be  relatively  quite  healthy.  Seeking  an  explanation,  researchers 
discovered that the parents of the relatively healthy children were routinely defying community norms about the 
‘proper’ way to feed and raise children. These parents, for example, provided their children with several small 
meals each day rather than one or two large ones; continued to feed their children even when the children had 
diarrhea; and added sweet-potato greens, a low status food, to the children’s rice. On the broader implications of 
‘the power of positive deviance’ for innovation and reform, see Pascale, Sternin and Sternin (2010).  
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interventions themselves. Facilitating such positive deviations, through incremental steps, 
is especially important in uncertain and complex contexts where reformers are unsure of 
what the problems and solutions actually are and lack confidence in their abilities to 
make things better.  
‘Muddling through’ like this does not mean being muddled in the search for change 
options. Instead, it implies taking a gradual approach to addressing particular problems. 
In reflecting on this, Bonnie McCay (2002: 368) describes ‘muddling through’ as “a go-
slow, incremental approach to problem solving.” Given this, one would expect 
incremental reforms to be focused on specific problems and the contextual realities in 
which these fester. This kind of focus ensures that actions taken in the name of 
development are what Richard Rose (2003: 20) calls ‘relevant’, or “politically acceptable 
and within the resources of government.” The focus on problems helps to build political 
support, with incremental reform gains consolidating it. The awareness of factors that are 
causing problems ensures that the chosen solutions are possible, given contextual 
constraints. Stepwise reforms contribute to building capacity and loosening these 
constraints over time.  
Incremental reforms focused on addressing problems frequently result in hybrid 
combinations of elements that work together to get the job done. Various authors have 
described the path to such solutions as bricolage (Dacin, Goodstein and Scott 2002: 50; 
see also Campbell 2004: 65), or the process by which internal agents ‘make do’ with 
resources at hand to foster new (or ‘hybrid’) structures and mechanisms.
10 The final 
product thus contrasts with what Ostrom (2008) calls “optimal” solutions embodied in 
external ideas of ‘right rules’ or ‘one-best-way’ or ‘best practice’ reforms. As argued, we 
believe the imposition of such “optimal” solutions is a main reason why novelty is 
constrained in development. The process of positive deviance through bricolage is, in 
contrast, only possible when novelty is encouraged and rewarded within the authorizing 
environment
11 within which key decisions are made. It is a process that helps 
organizations escape capability traps but must be accommodated by system-wide 
mechanisms that allow non-linear, frustrating (sometimes even contentious) processes of 
change that are liable to produce idiosyncratic (perhaps odd-looking) solutions. In Figure 
2’s example, for instance, the government might end up proposing a continued sole 
source textbook procurement mechanism because of a deficient set of potential vendors, 
but take practical steps to improve the timing of contracts and provide community-level 
inspections of vendor performance. This is like choosing a slow and odd-looking camel 
                                                       
10 See Mair and Marti (2009). Pritchett, Samji and Hammer (2012) deploy similar language in calling for 
measures in development programming that facilitate “crawling the design space”—that is, allowing specific 
project design elements in particular contexts to emerge as a result of pragmatic explorations for best-fit solutions 
within the range of possible options. 
11 The notion of ‘authorizing environments’—the delimited organizational domains over which managers 
have formal decision-making authority—comes from Moore (1995).  
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to help one ride through the desert, in lieu of a much faster and more impressive looking 
horse, given the camel’s relevance in its context. It is the kind of decision that reformers 
make as a result of positive deviance and experimentation, but will always be difficult to 
‘sell’ to outsiders who did not muddle through with them, and whose primary metric of 
success or ‘rigor’ is the extent to which a given option complies with a known global 
‘best practice’ (‘professional’, ‘expert’) standard.  
The importance of active learning mechanisms and iterative feedback 
loops 
A problem-driven, stepwise reform process can thus help countries escape from 
capability traps. This kind of process typifies change in the cooperative structures studied 
by authors like Elinor Ostrom.
12 Drawing from such experiences, we argue that positive 
deviance and experimentation has its greatest impact when connected with learning 
mechanisms. These ensure the dynamic collection and immediate feedback of lessons 
about what works and why. McCay references such mechanisms in noting that “[e]fforts 
to learn and the capacity to adapt … contribute to the emergence of effective” solutions 
in cooperatives.
13 We note further that this learning is active, happening in the process of 
real-world experimentation. In referencing such, Ostrom argues that “[t]he process of 
choice … always involves experimentation”
14 because “[i]t is hard to find the right 
combination of rules that work in a particular setting”; as such, one has to “try multiple 
combinations of rules and keep making small adjustments to get the systems working 
well.”
15  
Active learning through real-world experimentation allows reformers to learn a lot from 
the ‘small-step’ interventions they pursue to address problems (or causes of problems). 
They learn, for instance, about contextual constraints to change in general, how specific 
interventions work (or not), and how these interventions interact with other potential 
solutions. This facilitates bricolage, with lessons becoming part of the landscape of 
knowledge and capacities ‘at hand’ from which new arrangements emerge in resource 
constrained settings.
16 Some call this “trying out solutions” (Baker and Nelson 2005: 334) 
while others refer to it as the continuous testing of new combinations of ideas. The 
lessons learned in such experimentation are dynamic and make the biggest difference 
when immediately incorporated into the design discussions about change. In this respect 
the learning mechanism differs significantly from traditional monitoring and evaluation 
                                                       
12 McCay (2002: 368). This approach is exemplified in Ostrom (2005, 2008). 
13 Ibid. 
14 Ostrom (2008: 47). 
15 Ostrom (2008: 49). 
16 Dorado, 2005; Garud and Karnøe, 2003; Mair and Marti, 2009.  
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mechanisms that focus on compliance with a linear process of reform and allow ‘lessons’ 
only at the end of a project.  
This kind of experimentation and learning is also very different from the field 
experiments used in randomized trials.
17 The experimentation we refer to does not 
involve (always) performing a scientific experiment where the context is suspended and 
the intervention (by construction) is not allowed to change or vary over the life of the 
experiment. Rather, it is about trying a real intervention in a real context, allowing on-
the-ground realities to shape content in the process. This is also not about proving that 
specific ideas or mechanisms universally ‘work’ or do not work. Rather, it is about 
allowing a process to emerge through which attributes from various ideas can coalesce 
into new hybrids. This requires seeing lessons learned about potential combinations as 
the key emerging result. The necessary experimentation processes require mechanisms 
that capture lessons and ensure these are used to inform future activities.  
Using the procurement reform example shown in Figure 2, one might think of the first 
step as experimentation around an intervention intended to show the possibility of 
positive gain and which yields lessons for next steps. Information about the timing of 
textbook deliveries might be collected to contribute a database of vendor performance, 
for instance, helping foster state capabilities to oversee contracts. The collection process 
could be bound by time and location, focused on a set of districts and a period of just one 
month. In this period monitors would work daily with teams going out to record when 
textbooks were delivered, constantly transcribing lessons about which information 
sources were most reliable, which kinds of questions yielded information quickest, and so 
forth. The lessons would be fed back to collection teams on an ongoing basis and these 
teams would be empowered to adjust their methods as the lessons suggested; perhaps 
focusing on select sources instead of others. The goal would be to allow front line 
workers and their leaders to find new solutions that improved organizational 
performance, in due course yielding greater state capability and functionality regardless 
of form.  
The importance of broad engagement for assuring viability, legitimacy and 
relevance 
The discussion should make it apparent that we do not believe that building the state’s 
capability for implementation—or development in general—happens exclusively or even 
predominantly from the top-down. We hold, rather, that change primarily takes root when 
it involves broad sets of agents engaged together in designing and implementing locally 
                                                       
17 For a discussion of the distinction between ‘experimentation’ and ‘experiments’ in learning about 
development, see Pritchett (2011) and Pritchett, Samji and Hammer (2012).  
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relevant solutions to locally perceived problems. Our argument draws on literatures about 
institutional entrepreneurship and the importance of distributed agency in the process of 
change and development.  
Many articles in the literature on institutional entrepreneurship start by noting the 
problematic paradox of embeddedness. This asks how agents embedded in institutional 
mechanisms can simultaneously find and introduce changes to these mechanisms.
18 This 
paradox offers a particular challenge to those who believe change happens from the top-
down in societies, where the most powerful ministers or managers push through radical 
reforms. Essentially, these powerful agents or elites are commonly considered the most 
embedded in their contexts, and thus are often the least likely to perceive the need for 
change, to have access to ideas for change, or to risk their interests in pressing for 
change. In contrast, agents at the periphery—or front line—are less embedded in extant 
rules, which is partly why they also benefit less from them. Their low embeddedness 
makes them more open to criticizing incumbents and to entertain change; but they lack 
the power to make it happen.  
Given such thinking, change is only possible if something bridges the agents with power 
to those with ideas. At its most simple, this could involve a direct or third party link 
between a central leader and front line agent. Such a bridge could open the elite to an 
alternate awareness of their reality and spur a process of entrepreneurship, through which 
multiple agents combine to define and introduce change in their contexts. These can be 
organizations or individuals. They connect over time—directly and indirectly—in 
networks that facilitate transitions from one rules system to another. Different agents 
have different functional roles in these networks: some provide power and others bring 
awareness of problems; some supply ideas or resources, while others act as connectors or 
bridgers. Change comes out of their interactions, not through their individual 
engagements. 
Consider, for example, the importance of connecting the technical head of the 
procurement bureau implied in Figure 2 to political heavyweights protecting established 
vendors’ interests. Consider also the need to involve field-level officers and school 
principals who manage procurement transactions, receive textbooks, and have face-to-
face interactions with suppliers. This last group is commonly called de-concentrated or 
distributed agents and is often ignored in state capability interventions or seen as passive 
targets of change. Andrea Whittle and colleagues note that this is a major omission, 
“because an institutional template that is not enacted by all members of an organizational 
field would invariably fail to become an institution at all” (Whittle, Suhomlinova and 
                                                       
18 Carlile and Lakhani (2011) refer to this as the “novelty-confirmation-transformation” cycle and point out 
that organizations need both “confirmation” mechanisms that reinforce organizational continuity and coherence 
but also some way of recognizing, evaluating, and incorporating novelty.   
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Mueller 2011: 552). They argue that any kind of change, including by implication state 
capability building for development, requires “the involvement, interaction and conjoint 
activity of multiple actors” and especially “the more mundane and less prominent, but 
nevertheless essential, activities of ‘others’ in the institutional work associated with 
emergent institution-building” (p. 553). These ‘others’ need to be considered because 
they are also subject to questions of institutional embeddedness. If institutionalized rules 
of the game have a prior and shared influence on these agents, why should they be 
expected to change simply because some leaders tell them to?  
A host of new institutional scholars emphasize the importance of fostering broad 
engagement in the process of institutional change and institution building. Multiple 
entrepreneurs and distributed agents come to implement new institutions through a 
process that promotes “understanding, using, and mastering” them (Jin, Kim and 
Srivastava 1998: 231). Such processes can be conceptualized in light of Greenwood, 
Suddaby and Hinings’ (2002) influential model of ‘Theorizing Change’. They suggest 
that institutional adjustment typically emerges from a process that begins with jolts but 
passes through a series of five stages, with the last two titled diffusion, and re-
institutionalization. The details of this model are not important for this article. What does 
matter is that the model suggests an extreme limit where change processes in the stages 
preceding diffusion are characterized by narrow, top-down engagement. Diffusion 
demands broad support for change which is not attained through narrow hierarchical 
processes. This idea is reinforced in research showing that higher levels of decision 
centrality in institutional change processes yield lower rates of intra-organizational 
diffusion (Jin, Kim and Srivastava 1998). In contrast, higher rates of participation in 
change decisions produce greater rates of diffusion.  
Such effects are amplified where the organization or field undergoing change is large, de-
concentrated and informal, and where distributed agents co-inhabit multiple other fields 
that foster heterogeneous interests and cognitions in those targeted for change. Diffusion 
is extremely difficult under such conditions and is further undermined by an overly-
centralized approach to change. One will find that many agents in the heterogeneous, de-
concentrated group will not implement the adopted changes under such conditions. They 
cannot be forced to do so and will not do so voluntarily because they do not share the 
understanding that change is needed or that the prescribed solutions are appropriate. 
We argue that these are the realities of many contexts in which state-building initiatives 
are introduced. Narrowly engaged change processes in such contexts exacerbate 
capability traps, giving front line workers and even indirectly-involved leaders a message 
that their concerns and value creation ideas are not welcome. We advocate, therefore, for 
the adoption of convening and connection mechanisms that allow broader engagement in 
designing, experimenting and diffusing reforms intended to strengthen states. 
‘Convening’ typically involves bringing groups of leaders together with key  
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implementers to craft local experiments and solutions (Dorado 2005), while ‘connection’ 
involves ensuring second and third degree interactions with frontline workers who will 
ultimately have to implement final changes (Andrews, McConnell and Wescott 2008). 
These processes allow and encourage agents to move from left to right in Figure 1, 
escaping capability traps and moving into a context where organizations demand 
inspired, informed and concerned contributions from their people.  
Contrasts and similarities 
The main contrast of PDIA would be with the dominant ‘big development’ efforts of 
mainstream development organizations such as bilateral donors and the World Bank. 
These organizations are full of amazingly dedicated and intelligent people, but these 
agents are themselves often locked into ecosystems and organizational practices beyond 
their control. That this leads to problems with effective implementation of Bank projects 
has long been identified and discussed (at least since the Wapenhans Report of 1992) but 
it is very difficult to solve, in part because certain organizational stakeholders have the 
power to veto actual or potential changes.  
This dynamic leads mainstream development organizations to be extremely effective at 
some types of development activities and much less good at others. There are two types 
of activities that are easily supported and are likely to lead to success; hence by no means 
have the World Bank (or donors more generally) been widespread failures, as is often the 
caricature. First, if a task really requires a ‘logistical’ solution—e.g., the scaling up of a 
technologically known solution that does not involve high implementation intensity in 
operation—then donor projects nearly always succeed.
19 One should not lose sight of the 
basic fact that on many standard indicators of well-being, development has been a 
massive success, such as the expansion of schooling or the “millions saved” through 
expansion of vaccinations or simple public health interventions (Levine 2004). In nearly 
every physical dimension of access—to roads, sanitation, schools, electricity—the 
approach has been a resounding, unqualified success (Kenny 2011). 
Second, if a task really requires less government intervention then the donors’ actions 
have often been effective, since scaling the state back out of certain things that were both 
misguided about cause-effect relationships and beyond the implementation capability of 
governments was desirable and possible. For instance, many governments, through a 
variety of ideological commitments, policy mis-steps and macroeconomic shocks, backed 
themselves into rationing foreign exchange. This was, by and large, a disaster, as it had 
both economic and organizationally perverse consequences. Hence ‘at a stroke’ or ‘policy 
implementation light’ reforms that eliminated this rationing through devaluation and 
                                                       
19 On this point see Pritchett and Woolcock (2004).  
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liberalization were truly ‘win-win’ and could be implemented via external conditionality 
and financial support.  
Where the ‘mainstream’ approach founders, however, is precisely when it confronts 
activities like building organizational and state capability, since these tasks require (a) 
enormous numbers of discretionary decisions and (b) extensive and intensive face-to-face 
transactions to be carried out by (c) implementing agents needing to resist large 
temptations to do something besides implement the policy that would produce the desired 
outcome, and yet do so by (d) deploying ‘technology’ (or instruments) to bring about the 
desired change that are largely unknown ex ante. It is for precisely these types of 
development activities—and, importantly, elements of activities within more traditional 
technical sectors—that we propose PDIA as a pragmatic alternative. 
Table 1: Contrasting current approaches and PDIA 
 
Elements of approach  Mainstream Development 
Projects/Policies/Programs 
Problem Driven Iterative 
Adaptation 
What drives action?  Externally nominated problems or 
‘solutions’ in which deviation from 
‘best practice’ forms is itself 
defined as the problem  
Locally Problem Driven—
looking to solve particular 
problems  
Planning for action   Lots of advance planning, 
articulating a plan of action, with 
implementation regarded as 
following the planned script. 
‘Muddling through’ with 
the authorization of 
positive deviance and a 
purposive crawl of the 
available design space  
Feedback loops   Monitoring (short loops, focused 
on disbursement and process 
compliance) and Evaluation (long 
feedback loop on outputs, maybe 
outcomes)  
Tight feedback loops based 
on the problem and on 
experimentation with 
information loops 
integrated with decisions.  
Plans for scaling up and 
diffusion of learning 
Top-down—the head learns and 
leads, the rest listen and follow. 
Diffusion of feasible 
practice across 
organizations and 
communities of 
practitioners  
 
Finally, we wish to emphasize that our critique and approach share many similarities with 
other new approaches. For instance, Nancy Birdsall and the Center for Global 
Development have been promoting “Cash on Delivery” (COD) aid (see Birdsall and 
Savedoff 2010). This is a mechanism by which donors would deliver resources to 
countries for achievements (versus a benchmark). This frees up the country to achieve 
those results however it wishes; rather than a focus on disbursement against planned  
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inputs it would disburse against outcomes, however achieved. Similarly, there are new 
organizations like Innovations for Scaled Impact (iScale)
20 that are based on very similar 
principles of bringing together local control over the problem nomination and definition 
stage with support to innovations built within tight feedback looks of evaluation and 
embedded in communities of practice. The World Bank itself is attempting support to 
various types of “results based financing” (see Brenzel 2009 on World Bank supported 
health projects) and the very recently introduced Program-for-Results lending.  
 
Conclusion 
This article is a follow up on our past work trying to explain the limited results of many 
efforts to build state capabilities in developing countries. This work’s core argument is 
that the politics and processes of development interventions have fostered and 
exacerbated capability traps in many developing countries, wherein governments are 
being required to adopt best practice reforms that ultimately cannot work and end up 
crowding out alternative ideas and initiatives that may have emerged from local agents. 
Capability traps close the space for novelty, establishing fixed best-practice agendas as 
the basis of evaluating developing countries and of granting organizations in these 
countries support and legitimacy if they comply with such agendas. In so doing they have 
all but excluded local agents from the process of building their own states, implicitly 
undermining the value-creating ideas of local leaders and front line workers. The upshot 
is unimplemented laws, unfunded agencies, and unused processes littering education 
sectors, public financial management regimes and judiciaries across the globe (Pritchett, 
Woolcock and Andrews 2010). Governments adopting such reforms look better for a 
period—when laws are newly passed, for instance—but ultimately they do not 
demonstrate higher levels of performance, as new laws are not put into practice. 
Here we have suggested an approach that can help countries escape from the capability 
trap. It involves pursuing development interventions based on a very different set of 
principles. These interventions should (i) aim to solve particular problems in local 
contexts, (ii) through the creation of an authorizing environment that facilitates positive 
deviance and experimentation, (iii) involving active, ongoing and experiential learning 
and the iterative feedback of lessons into new solutions, and (iv) engaging broad sets of 
agents to ensure that reforms are viable, legitimate and relevant—i.e., politically 
supportable and practically implementable. We suggest that these four principles could be 
combined into a new way of doing development and state building, which we tentatively 
title Problem Driven Iterative Adaptation (PDIA). Our aim beyond this article is to use 
PDIA methods in particular interventions, and to gather accounts of where they may already 
                                                       
20 See www.scalingimpact.net (accessed February 13, 2012).  
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have been introduced, the better to learn from the grounded experiences of others and to 
adapt/update/refine PDIA accordingly. As such it is an ongoing process to which we 
actively encourage readers to contribute. 
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